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Mulvaney, Robert J. - Classic Philosophical Questions (14th Ed.) - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. Classic Philosophical. Mulvaney Robert J Classic Philosophical Questions 14th Ed - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. classical. Euthyphro: Defining Philosophical Terms. 3. 2. The Apology, Phaedo, and Crito: The Trial,. Immortality, and Death of Socrates. PART 2. The Value of.


Classical Philosophical Questions Pdf

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Classic and Contemporary Primary Source Readings. Classic Philosophical Questions has presented decades of students with the most compelling classic and. Plato and the trial of Socrates -- What is philosophy? -- Euthyphro: defining philosophical terms -- The apology, Phaedo, and Crito: the trial, immortality, and . Classic Philosophical Questions, 14th Edition. Robert J. Mulvaney, University of .. Classic Philosophical Questions, 13th Edition. Gould & Mulvaney. ©

So, you see, they say one thing in the case of the gods and quite another in mine.

I mean, because I find it hard to accept such stories people tell about the gods? I expect that I shall be found at fault because I doubt those stories. Now if you who understand all these matters so well agree in holding all those tales true, then I suppose that I must yield to your authority.

What could I say when I admit myself that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of friendship, do you really believe that these things have actually happened? SOCR: Then you really believe that there is war among the gods, and bitter hatreds, and battles, such as the poets tell of.

Mulvaney, Robert J. - Classic Philosophical Questions (14th Ed.)

As I was saying, I will report to you many other stories about divine matters, if you like, which I am sure will astonish you when you hear them. SOCR: I dare say.

You shall report them to me at your leisure another time. At present please try to give a more definite answer to the question which I asked you just now.

What I asked you, my friend, was, What is piety? You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for murder, is a pious act. SOCR: Very likely. But many other actions are pious, are they not, Euthyphro? EUTH: Certainly. SOCR: Remember, then, I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many pious actions that there are; I want to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious.

You said, I think, that there is one characteristic which makes all pious actions pious, and another characteristic which makes all impious actions impious. Do you not remember? EUTH: I do. SOCR: Well, then, explain to me what is this characteristic, that I may have it to turn to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions and those of other men, and be able to say that whatever action resembles it is pious, and whatever does not, is not pious.

What is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to them is impious. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted. Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet.

But, of course, you will go on to prove that it is true. The things and the men that are pleasing to the gods are pious, and the things and the men that are displeasing to the gods are impious. But piety and impiety are not the same; they are as opposite as possiblewas not that what he said?

SOCR: Have we not also said, Euthyphro, that there are quarrels and disagreements and hatreds among the gods? EUTH: We have. SOCR: But what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and anger? Let us look at the matter thus. If you and I were to disagree as to whether one number were more than another, would that make us angry and enemies?

Should we not settle such a dispute at once by counting? EUTH: Of course. SOCR: And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them and put an end to the disagreement at once, should we not? And should we not settle a question about the relative weight of two things by weighing them?

SOCR: Then what is the question which would make us angry and enemies if we disagreed about it, and could not come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not an answer ready; but listen to mine. Is it not the question of the just and unjust, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of the good and the bad?

Is it not questions about these matters which make you and me and everyone else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory agreement?

EUTH: Yes. Socrates, it is disagreements about these matters. SOCR: Well, Euthyphro, the gods will quarrel over these things if they quarrel at all, will they not?

Mulvaney, Robert J. - Classic Philosophical Questions (14th Ed.)

SOCR: Then, my good Euthyphro, you say that some of the gods think one thing just, the others, another; and that what some of them hold to be honorable or good, others hold to be dishonorable or evil.

For there would not have been quarrels among them if they had not disagreed on these points, would there? SOCR: And each of them loves what he thinks honorable, and good, and just; and hates the opposite, does he not? SOCR: But you say that the same action is held by some of them to be just, and by others to be unjust; and that then they dispute about it, and so quarrel and fight among themselves.

Is it not so? SOCR: Then the same thing is hated by the gods and loved by them; and the same thing will be displeasing and pleasing to them. EUTH: Apparently. SOCR: Then, according to your account, the same thing will be pious and impious. EUTH: So it seems. SOCR: Then, my good friend, you have not answered my question. I did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious; but it seems that whatever is pleasing to the gods is also displeasing to them. And so, Euthyphro, I should not be surprised if what you are doing now in punish- ing your father is an action well pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Uranus, and acceptable to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera; and if any of the other gods disagree about it, pleasing to some of them and displeasing to others.

EUTH: But on this point, Socrates, I think that there is no difference of opinion among the gods: they all hold that if one man kills another unjustly, he must be punished. Among mankind, have you never heard disputes whether a man ought to be punished for killing another man unjustly, or for doing some other unjust deed? EUTH: Indeed, they never cease from these disputes, especially in courts of justice. They do all manner of unjust things; and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid punishment.

SOCR: Do they admit that they have done something unjust, and at the same time deny that they ought to be punished, Euthyphro? EUTH: No, indeed, that they do not. SOCR: Then it is not the case that there is nothing which they will not do and say. I take it, they do not dare to say or argue that they must not be punished if they have done something unjust. What they say is that they have not done anything unjust, is it not so?

EUTH: That is true. SOCR: Then they do not disagree over the question that the unjust individual must be punished. They disagree over the question, who is unjust, and what was done and when, do they not? SOCR: Well, is not exactly the same thing true of the gods if they quarrel about justice and injustice, as you say they do?

Do not some of them say that the others are doing something unjust, while the others deny it? No one, I suppose, my dear friend, whether god or man, dares to say that a person who has done something unjust must not be punished. SOCR: I take it, Euthyphro, that the disputants, whether men or gods, if the gods do disagree, disagree over each separate act.

When they quarrel about any act, some of them say that it was just, and others that it was unjust. What proof have you that all the gods think that a laborer who has been imprisoned for murder by the master of the man whom he has murdered, and who dies from his imprisonment before the master has had time to learn from the religious authorities what he should do, dies unjustly?

How do you know that it is just for a son to indict his father and to prosecute him for the murder of such a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the gods necessarily agree in thinking that this action of yours is just; and if you satisfy me, I will never cease singing your praises for wisdom. To them, of course, you will make it clear that your father has committed an unjust action, and that all the gods agree in hating such actions. SOCR: They will listen if they think that you are a good speaker.

But while you were talking, it occurred to me to ask myself this question: suppose that Euthyphro were to prove to me as clearly as possible that all the gods think such a death unjust, how has he brought me any nearer to under- standing what piety and impiety are? This particular act, perhaps, may be displeasing to the gods, but then we have just seen that piety and impi- ety cannot be defined in that way; for we have seen that what is dis- pleasing to the gods is also pleasing to them.

So I will let you off on this point, Euthyphro; and all the gods shall agree in thinking your fathers action wrong and in hating it, if you like.

But shall we correct our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is impious, and whatever they all love is pious; while whatever some of them love, and others hate, is either both or neither? Do you wish us now to define piety and impiety in this manner? It is for you to consider whether that definition will help you to teach me what you promised. EUTH: Well, I should say that piety is what all the gods love, and that impiety is what they all hate. SOCR: We shall know that better in a little while, my good friend.

Now consider this question. Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? SOCR: I will try to explain myself: we speak of a thing being carried and carrying, and being led and leading, and being seen and seeing; and you understand that all such expressions mean different things, and what the difference is. SOCR: And we talk of a thing being loved, of a thing loving, and the two are different? SOCR: Now tell me, is a thing which is being carried in a state of being carried because it is carried, or for some other reason?

EUTH: No, because it is carried. SOCR: And a thing is in a state of being led because it is led, and of being seen because it is seen?

Refine your editions:

SOCR: Then a thing is not seen because it is in a state of being seen: it is in a state of being seen because it is seen; and a thing is not led because it is in a state of being led: it is in a state of being led because it is led; and a thing is not carried because it is in a state of being carried: it is in a state of being carried because it is carried.

Is my meaning clear now, Euthyphro? I mean this: if anything becomes or is affected, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming: it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; and it is not affected because it is in a state of being affected: it is in a state of being affected because it is affected. Do you not agree? SOCR: Is not that which is being loved in a state either of becoming or of being affected in some way by something?

SOCR: Then the same is true here as in the former cases. A thing is not loved by those who love it because it is in a state of being loved; it is in a state of being loved because they love it. EUTH: Necessarily. Is it not loved by all the gods, according to your definition?

SOCR: Because it is pious, or for some other reason? EUTH: No, because it is pious. SOCR: Then it is loved by the gods because it is pious; it is not pious because it is loved by them? EUTH: It seems so. SOCR: But, then, what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them, and is in a state of being loved by them, because they love it? They are different things. SOCR: Because we are agreed that the gods love piety because it is pious, and that it is not pious because they love it. Is not this so?

SOCR: And that what is pleasing to the gods because they love it, is pleasing to them by reason of this same love, and that they do not love it because it is pleasing to them. If the gods had loved piety because it is pious, they would also have loved what is pleasing to them because it is pleasing to them; but if what is pleasing to them had been pleasing to them because they loved it, then piety, too, would have been piety because they loved it.

But now you see that they are opposite things, and wholly different from each other. For the one is of a sort to be loved because it is loved, while the other is loved because it is of a sort to be loved. My question, Euthyphro, was, What is piety? But it turns out that you have not explained to me the essential character of piety; you have been content to mention an effect which belongs to itnamely, that all gods love it. You have not yet told me what its essential character is. Do not, if you please, keep from me what piety is; begin again and tell me that.

At present please try to give a more definite answer to the question which I asked you just now. What I asked you, my friend, was, What is piety? You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for murder, is a pious act. SOCR: Very likely. But many other actions are pious, are they not, Euthyphro? EUTH: Certainly. SOCR: Remember, then, I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many pious actions that there are; I want to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious.

You said, I think, that there is one characteristic which makes all pious actions pious, and another characteristic which makes all impious actions impious. Do you not remember? EUTH: I do. SOCR: Well, then, explain to me what is this characteristic, that I may have it to turn to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions and those of other men, and be able to say that whatever action resembles it is pious, and whatever does not, is not pious.

What is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to them is impious. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted. Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet. But, of course, you will go on to prove that it is true. The things and the men that are pleasing to the gods are pious, and the things and the men that are displeasing to the gods are impious.

But piety and impiety are not the same; they are as opposite as possiblewas not that what he said? SOCR: Have we not also said, Euthyphro, that there are quarrels and disagreements and hatreds among the gods?

EUTH: We have. SOCR: But what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and anger? Let us look at the matter thus. If you and I were to disagree as to whether one number were more than another, would that make us angry and enemies? Should we not settle such a dispute at once by counting? EUTH: Of course. SOCR: And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them and put an end to the disagreement at once, should we not?

And should we not settle a question about the relative weight of two things by weighing them? SOCR: Then what is the question which would make us angry and enemies if we disagreed about it, and could not come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not an answer ready; but listen to mine. Is it not the question of the just and unjust, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of the good and the bad? Is it not questions about these matters which make you and me and everyone else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory agreement?

EUTH: Yes. Socrates, it is disagreements about these matters. SOCR: Well, Euthyphro, the gods will quarrel over these things if they quarrel at all, will they not? SOCR: Then, my good Euthyphro, you say that some of the gods think one thing just, the others, another; and that what some of them hold to be honorable or good, others hold to be dishonorable or evil.

For there would not have been quarrels among them if they had not disagreed on these points, would there? SOCR: And each of them loves what he thinks honorable, and good, and just; and hates the opposite, does he not? SOCR: But you say that the same action is held by some of them to be just, and by others to be unjust; and that then they dispute about it, and so quarrel and fight among themselves. Is it not so? SOCR: Then the same thing is hated by the gods and loved by them; and the same thing will be displeasing and pleasing to them.

EUTH: Apparently. SOCR: Then, according to your account, the same thing will be pious and impious. EUTH: So it seems. SOCR: Then, my good friend, you have not answered my question.

I did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious; but it seems that whatever is pleasing to the gods is also displeasing to them. And so, Euthyphro, I should not be surprised if what you are doing now in punish- ing your father is an action well pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Uranus, and acceptable to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera; and if any of the other gods disagree about it, pleasing to some of them and displeasing to others.

EUTH: But on this point, Socrates, I think that there is no difference of opinion among the gods: they all hold that if one man kills another unjustly, he must be punished. Among mankind, have you never heard disputes whether a man ought to be punished for killing another man unjustly, or for doing some other unjust deed?

EUTH: Indeed, they never cease from these disputes, especially in courts of justice. They do all manner of unjust things; and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid punishment. SOCR: Do they admit that they have done something unjust, and at the same time deny that they ought to be punished, Euthyphro? EUTH: No, indeed, that they do not.

SOCR: Then it is not the case that there is nothing which they will not do and say. I take it, they do not dare to say or argue that they must not be punished if they have done something unjust.

What they say is that they have not done anything unjust, is it not so? EUTH: That is true. SOCR: Then they do not disagree over the question that the unjust individual must be punished. They disagree over the question, who is unjust, and what was done and when, do they not?

SOCR: Well, is not exactly the same thing true of the gods if they quarrel about justice and injustice, as you say they do? Do not some of them say that the others are doing something unjust, while the others deny it? No one, I suppose, my dear friend, whether god or man, dares to say that a person who has done something unjust must not be punished. SOCR: I take it, Euthyphro, that the disputants, whether men or gods, if the gods do disagree, disagree over each separate act. When they quarrel about any act, some of them say that it was just, and others that it was unjust.

What proof have you that all the gods think that a laborer who has been imprisoned for murder by the master of the man whom he has murdered, and who dies from his imprisonment before the master has had time to learn from the religious authorities what he should do, dies unjustly? How do you know that it is just for a son to indict his father and to prosecute him for the murder of such a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the gods necessarily agree in thinking that this action of yours is just; and if you satisfy me, I will never cease singing your praises for wisdom.

To them, of course, you will make it clear that your father has committed an unjust action, and that all the gods agree in hating such actions. SOCR: They will listen if they think that you are a good speaker. But while you were talking, it occurred to me to ask myself this question: suppose that Euthyphro were to prove to me as clearly as possible that all the gods think such a death unjust, how has he brought me any nearer to under- standing what piety and impiety are?

This particular act, perhaps, may be displeasing to the gods, but then we have just seen that piety and impi- ety cannot be defined in that way; for we have seen that what is dis- pleasing to the gods is also pleasing to them. So I will let you off on this point, Euthyphro; and all the gods shall agree in thinking your fathers action wrong and in hating it, if you like. But shall we correct our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is impious, and whatever they all love is pious; while whatever some of them love, and others hate, is either both or neither?

Do you wish us now to define piety and impiety in this manner? It is for you to consider whether that definition will help you to teach me what you promised. EUTH: Well, I should say that piety is what all the gods love, and that impiety is what they all hate. SOCR: We shall know that better in a little while, my good friend. Now consider this question. Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? SOCR: I will try to explain myself: we speak of a thing being carried and carrying, and being led and leading, and being seen and seeing; and you understand that all such expressions mean different things, and what the difference is.

SOCR: And we talk of a thing being loved, of a thing loving, and the two are different?

SOCR: Now tell me, is a thing which is being carried in a state of being carried because it is carried, or for some other reason? EUTH: No, because it is carried. SOCR: And a thing is in a state of being led because it is led, and of being seen because it is seen? SOCR: Then a thing is not seen because it is in a state of being seen: it is in a state of being seen because it is seen; and a thing is not led because it is in a state of being led: it is in a state of being led because it is led; and a thing is not carried because it is in a state of being carried: it is in a state of being carried because it is carried.

Is my meaning clear now, Euthyphro? I mean this: if anything becomes or is affected, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming: it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; and it is not affected because it is in a state of being affected: it is in a state of being affected because it is affected. Do you not agree? SOCR: Is not that which is being loved in a state either of becoming or of being affected in some way by something?

SOCR: Then the same is true here as in the former cases. A thing is not loved by those who love it because it is in a state of being loved; it is in a state of being loved because they love it.

EUTH: Necessarily. Is it not loved by all the gods, according to your definition? SOCR: Because it is pious, or for some other reason? EUTH: No, because it is pious. SOCR: Then it is loved by the gods because it is pious; it is not pious because it is loved by them? EUTH: It seems so. SOCR: But, then, what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them, and is in a state of being loved by them, because they love it? They are different things.

SOCR: Because we are agreed that the gods love piety because it is pious, and that it is not pious because they love it. Is not this so? SOCR: And that what is pleasing to the gods because they love it, is pleasing to them by reason of this same love, and that they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

If the gods had loved piety because it is pious, they would also have loved what is pleasing to them because it is pleasing to them; but if what is pleasing to them had been pleasing to them because they loved it, then piety, too, would have been piety because they loved it. But now you see that they are opposite things, and wholly different from each other. For the one is of a sort to be loved because it is loved, while the other is loved because it is of a sort to be loved.

My question, Euthyphro, was, What is piety? But it turns out that you have not explained to me the essential character of piety; you have been content to mention an effect which belongs to itnamely, that all gods love it. You have not yet told me what its essential character is.

See a Problem?

Do not, if you please, keep from me what piety is; begin again and tell me that. Never mind whether the gods love it, or whether it has other effects: we shall not differ on that point.

Do your best to make clear to me what is piety and what is impiety. Whatever statement we put forward always somehow moves round in a circle, and will not stay where we put it. SOCR: Then we must begin again and inquire what piety is. I do not mean to give in until I have found out. Do not regard me as unworthy; give your whole mind to the question, and this time tell me the truth.

For if anyone knows it, it is you; and you are a Proteus whom I must not let go until you have told me.

It cannot be that you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for the murder of a laboring man unless you had known exactly what piety and impiety are. You would have feared to risk the anger of the gods, in case you should be doing wrong, and you would have been afraid of what men would say.

But now I am sure that you think that you know exactly what is pious and what is not; so tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think.Mulvaney, University of South Carolina. I suppose so.

Introduction to Philosophy/The Branches of Philosophy

There is only one thing a philosopher can be relied upon to do, and that is to contradict other philosophers. I will report to you many other stories about divine matters. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted. Philosophy of Religion Part 3: And you. Show related SlideShares at end. They do all manner of unjust things; and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid punishment.

Actions Shares.